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ANTI-TERRORISM COURTS AND
PROCEDURAL (IN)JUSTICE: THE CASE
OF THE NATIONAL INVESTIGATION
AGENCY (NIA) SPECIAL COURTS IN
SOUTH CHHATTISGARH, INDIA
—Shikha Pandey*

The National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (‘NIA Act’) was
enacted for setting up a central agency, namely the National
Investigation Agency. It is responsible for the investigation
and prosecution of offences related to national security. The
NIA Act prescribes a specific procedure for investigating any
offence classified as a ‘Scheduled Offence’ under Section 6 of
the NIA Act. In doing so, the NIA Act empowers the Central
Government and the state governments to designate Special
Courts by notification and vest them with the powers to investigate and prosecute Scheduled Offences in accordance with
the special procedures set out in the NIA Act. The aforementioned power has been exercised multiple times across
India by the Central Government and the state governments.
However, the powers vested in state governments pursuant to
Section 22 of the NIA Act to designate Special Courts, have
often been a point of debate and dispute before appellate
courts. The dispute has been on the grounds of ambiguity
and vagueness in the letter of the law. This paper examines
the NIA Act and judicial precedents, to analyse the extent of
the power vested in the state governments under Section 22 of
the NIA Act. Using the empirical study from the conflict-torn
region of Bastar in Chhattisgarh, the paper demonstrates that
the vagueness and ambiguity in Section 22 of the NIA Act has
been used by the state of Chhattisgarh to create an unintelligible classification of offences related to left-wing extremism,
for trial by the Special Court in Bastar. The paper will also
*
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show that such classification has resulted in a violation of the
procedural rights of individuals belonging to indigenous communities in Bastar.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The National Investigation Agency Act, 20081 (‘NIA Act’) was enacted in
the wake of the terror attacks in Mumbai, with the objective of creating a federal investigative agency, namely the National Investigation Agency (‘NIA’),
for investigation and prosecution of national security-related offences. Falling
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India,
the NIA is amongst the few federal-level investigative agencies empowered to
investigate and conduct prosecutions, which is a power ordinarily vested with
state governments.
The NIA Act demarcates a category of offences, termed as ‘Scheduled
Offences’. These are offences under other penal statutes that can be investigated by the NIA, including, inter alia, offences under laws dealing with
national security and terrorism. The NIA Act creates special procedures for
trials that deviate from the ordinary law on criminal procedure, and curtails
several procedural rights of the accused. It also provides for the designation of
‘Special Courts’ for the trial of these offences, though these Special Courts are
not provided for under those penal statutes. This signals a return to an earlier
trend under older, now repealed anti-terrorism laws,2 of constituting Special
Courts – a trend that had been discontinued in the anti-terrorism laws operating at present.
The implementation of the NIA Act has been fraught with legal challenges
in the High Courts of various states on the issue of the purpose and scope of
the NIA Act. The question that has been raised in appellate courts is whether
1

2

The National Investigation Agency Act 2008 was amended by the National Investigation
Agency (Amendment) Act 2019.
The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1987 (‘TADA’); The Prevention of
Terrorism Act 2002 (‘POTA’).
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the NIA Act is applicable to all cases registered under the Scheduled Offences
or only to those cases registered under the Scheduled Offences in which the
Central Government has expressly directed the NIA to carry out the investigation. This question has an important bearing on the administration of criminal justice and prosecution of Scheduled Offences in a region like Bastar in
South Chhattisgarh, due to the region’s unique social, geographic, and political
characteristics.
The Bastar division of Chhattisgarh forms the epicenter of the armed conflict between the Naxalites, a Maoist insurgent group, and the Indian state – a
conflict that has been going on for nearly two decades now. The region has a
security personnel to civilian population ratio of 1:22, with more than 1,08,772
armed forces personnel deployed against the insurgents.3 In conflict zones like
Bastar, the enforcement of national security laws in criminal prosecutions
targeted against Adivasi citizens often appears as an extension of the government’s counter-insurgency operations through legal intervention.4
In May 2015, the Chhattisgarh state government issued a notification to constitute a Special Court under the NIA Act having jurisdiction over the seven
conflict-affected districts of the Bastar region. This Special Court has jurisdiction over the trial of all cases registered in Bastar under Scheduled Offences,
irrespective of whether the NIA is involved in the investigation or not. The
indiscriminate use of national security laws against the Adivasis, coupled with
the enforcement of the Special Court under the NIA Act, has led to a peculiar situation. Most Naxalite-related cases spread over the entire conflict region
have been transferred to one NIA Special Judge who presides at the centre
of power of Bastar i.e. Jagdalpur. The Special Court, in theory, is purposed
to expedite the trial. However, the said notification has, instead, denuded the
existing trial courts of jurisdiction over the cases that were to be tried under
the ordinary criminal procedure. Since 2015, more than five hundred cases
registered under the Scheduled Offences have been instituted and tried under
special criminal procedures before the NIA Special Court in Bastar.5 The
administration of the law against the Adivasi population has led to the derogation of essential procedural safeguards against arbitrary prosecutions, denial of
access to justice, and the denial of a right to a free and fair trial.
Part II of the paper explains the legal rationale behind the constitution and
operation of Special Courts under the NIA Act. The paper argues that the
3

4

5

Gautam Navlakha, ‘A Savage War for ‘Development’’ (2017) 52(21) Economic & Political
Weekly 61.
Geoff Dancy and Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, ‘The Impact of Criminal Prosecutions During
Intra-State Conflict’ (2018) 55(1) Journal of Peace Research 47.
From the period July 2015 to December 2019, the data has been received from the office of
the Public Information Officer, Bastar District and Sessions Court, Jagdalpur. The data can be
accessed from the author.
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objective and purpose behind the NIA Act was not to create special procedures
for the investigation and trial of all Scheduled Offences under the NIA Act.
Instead, it is argued that the NIA Act only intended to create a specialized
investigating agency (i.e. the NIA) and a ‘Special Court’ for the investigation
and prosecution of offences by the NIA. In this context, the NIA Act goes on
to provide the Central Government with unfettered powers to direct the NIA to
investigate and prosecute Scheduled Offences before the Special Courts designated by it.6 On the other hand, the investigating agencies of state governments
can investigate and prosecute offences under the NIA Act only under specific
circumstances, based on a determination made by the Central Government.
Like the Central Government, state governments are also empowered to
designate Special Courts.7 Relying on the Full Bench judgment of the Patna
High Court in Bahadur Kora v State of Bihar8 and an analysis of Sections 7
and 10 of the NIA Act, the paper delineates the limited circumstances that
allow state governments to prosecute cases under Scheduled Offences before
the Special Courts. Under the scheme of the NIA Act, state governments can
exercise special powers of investigation and prosecution only after the Central
Government entrusts the investigation to the NIA, and the NIA decides to
either (i) associate the state government in the investigation, or (ii) transfer the
investigation to the state government. Only under these twin circumstances
can state governments invoke the provisions of the NIA Act. In all other cases,
state governments must follow the ordinary criminal procedure for investigation and prosecution. This position of law is the subject matter of the paper,
because in practice, state governments are arrogating to themselves the power
to invoke the special provisions of the NIA Act, to indiscriminately investigate
and prosecute all Scheduled Offences before the Special Courts designated
under Section 22. This is the case even when the Central Government has not
entrusted the NIA with the investigation. Sub-sections (A), (B), and (C) of Part
II of the paper discuss the provisions of the NIA Act and judicial precedents to
explain the circumstances under which the provisions of the NIA Act can be
legitimately invoked by the state governments. Sub-section (D) of Part II discusses the erroneous classification of offences created by the Chhattisgarh state
government between cases that are being tried in the designated Special Court
in Bastar and other cases being tried under ordinary criminal procedure. The
paper argues that this classification does not satisfy the ‘nexus test’ reiterated
by the Supreme Court in State of W.B. v Anwar Ali Sarkar.9 The classification
of cases adopted by Chhattisgarh state government under the NIA Act is arbitrary, as it is not in consonance with the purpose of the NIA Act.

6
7
8
9

NIA Act, s 11.
NIA Act, s 22.
2015 SCC OnLine Pat 1775.
AIR 1952 SC 75.
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Part III of the paper treats illustrations from the conflict-torn Bastar region
of Chhattisgarh as a case study to substantiate the argument of the misuse of Section 22 by the Chhattisgarh state government. This section of the
paper, supported by empirical analysis, demonstrates the aftermath of executive excess in the administration of the criminal justice system in one of the
most remote areas of India. The empirical study also underscores the extent of
the violation of due process of law and the right to access to justice, triggered
by such executive misuse. In doing so, not only are the procedural rights of
indigenous Adivasi citizens in Bastar (who form the bulk of the accused and
incarcerated in this region) abridged, but the very core of the right to a fair,
accessible, and speedy trial is jeopardized too.
Part IV offers recommendations for reforms in the criminal justice system
by decentralizing the institutions of justice, increasing the court’s accessibility
to the grassroots, and means to improve procedural rights.

II. THE NIA SPECIAL COURT: LEGAL
RATIONALE AND OPERATIONS
A. An Explainer to the NIA Act
The NIA Act was enacted with the objective of creating a central level
investigative agency, the NIA, for the investigation and prosecution of national
security-related offences. These are termed as ‘Scheduled Offences’, and are
listed in the Schedule to the NIA Act.10 It also provides for the designation of
Special Courts for the prosecution of such Scheduled Offences investigated by
the NIA or by the state investigating agency under specified circumstances as
prescribed under the NIA Act.

10

1. The Explosive Substances Act 1908;
1-A.	 The Atomic Energy Act 1962;
2.	 The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967;
3.	 The Anti-Hijacking Act 1982;
4.	 The Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Civil Aviation Act 1982;
5.	 The SAARC Convention (Suppression of Terrorism) Act 1993;
6.	 The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Maritime Navigation and Fixed
Platforms on Continental Shelf Act 2002;
7.	 The Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful
Activities) Act 2005;
8.	 Offences under—
(a) Chapter VI of the Indian Penal Code [s 121 to 130 (both inclusive)];
(b) s 370 and 370A of Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code;
(c) s 489-A to 489-E (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code;
(d) s 25(1AA) of Chapter V of the Arms Act 1959;
(e) s 66F of Chapter XI of the Information Technology Act 2000.
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Scheduled Offences comprise special legislations, such as the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (‘UAPA’), an anti-terrorism law, as well as
specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’)11 related to offences
against the state. With the NIA (Amendment) Act, 2019, the Parliament
has added further offences to the Schedule, i.e. cyber terrorism under the
Information and Technology Act, 2000, Section 25(1AA) of the Arms Act,
1959,12 human trafficking and counterfeiting currency notes under the IPC, and
all offences under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. This brings the total
tally in the Schedule to ten penal enactments, in addition to four classes of
offences under the IPC.

1.	 The Investigation
The procedure for investigation of Scheduled Offences is detailed under
Section 6 of the NIA Act. This prescribes that when a First Information Report
(‘FIR’) is registered for any Scheduled Offence by the officer-in-charge of the
police station, the state government is obligated to forward the said report to
the Central Government.13 The latter shall, within fifteen days, after considering the gravity of the offence and other relevant factors, determine whether
it is a fit case for investigation by the NIA.14 If it is of the opinion that a
Scheduled Offence has been committed which is required to be investigated
under the NIA Act, the Central Government shall entrust the investigation to
the NIA.15 Thenceforth, the power of the state investigating agencies to investigate and prosecute ceases.16 If the Central Government does not entrust the
investigation to the NIA within fifteen days of receipt of the said report, the
state investigating agency shall continue the investigation. It is also clarified
that till the NIA takes up the investigation, it shall be the duty of the officerin-charge of the police station to continue the investigation.17 The Central
Government also has the inordinate power to suo motu direct the NIA to
investigate a Scheduled Offence, if it is of the opinion that it requires investigation under the NIA Act.18

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

The Indian Penal Code 1860, s 121 to 130, s 489-A to 489-E, s 370 and 370A.
Arms Act 1959, s 25(1AA).
NIA Act, s 6(2).
NIA Act, s 6(3).
NIA Act, s 6(4).
NIA Act, s 6(6).
NIA Act, s 6(7).
NIA Act, s 6(5); The State of Chhattisgarh v National Investigative Agency Writ Appeal No.
511 of 2019. This case was with respect to the assassination of Bhima Mandavi, Member
of Legislative Assembly, in April 2019. The power of Central Government to transfer the
case to the NIA was challenged by Chhattisgarh state government before the High Court
of Chhattisgarh. The High Court upheld the decision of the Single Bench that directed the
state government to transfer the investigation to the NIA in light of the powers of the Central
Government under s 6(5).
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After the entrustment of the case by the Central Government to the NIA
under Section 6, the role of the state government in the investigation and prosecution under the NIA Act is limited to two circumstances, as described under
Section 7. Either the NIA may request the state government to associate itself
with the investigation,19 or with the prior approval of the Central Government,
the NIA may transfer the case to the state government for investigation and
trial of the offence.20 Therefore, as per the scheme of the NIA Act, the role
of the state government to investigate and prosecute offences in exercise of
the special powers provided under the NIA Act only come into play once the
preceding steps under Sections 6 and 7 have taken place.
In the absence of entrustment of the investigation by the Central
Government to the NIA, the powers of the state governments to investigate and
prosecute the offences listed in the Schedule are protected under Section 10 of
the NIA Act. However, such investigation and prosecution shall be under the
ordinary procedural law.

2.	 The Prosecution
After laying down the procedure for the investigation of the Scheduled
Offence, the NIA Act also prescribes the power of the Central and state governments to ‘designate’ Special Courts. The 2019 Amendment substituted the
earlier term ‘constitute’ with the term ‘designate’.21 Under the NIA Act, the
Central Government and state governments have an extraordinary power to
decide any question relating to the jurisdiction of any Special Court designated
by them, wherein the Government’s decision shall be considered as final.22 This
power prescribed under the NIA Act strikes at the heart of the fundamental
principle of independence of the judiciary from interference by the executive.
19
20
21

22

NIA Act, s 7(a).
NIA Act, s 7(b).
The NIA Act, when enacted, prescribed the ‘constitution’ of Special Courts which is now substituted by the word ‘designation’. Prior to the amendment, the practice involved the appointment of a Special Judge on the ‘recommendation of the Chief Justice of the High Court’.
The Central Government notified the designated Special Judge by her name in the gazette.
(NIA Act 2008, s 11(3) [this section has been omitted by the Amendment Act]); Nehal Bhuta,
‘Back to the Future, India’s 2008 Counterterrorism Laws’ (Human Rights Watch, 27 July
2010) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/07/27/back-future/indias-2008-counterterrorism-laws>
accessed 26 April 2020. It has been argued that the practice of special judicial appointment
of a judge by the executive to preside over a Special Court places a premium on judges
whose concerns about state security overshadow concerns about the due process rights of
the accused; Anil Kalhan and others, ‘Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Terrorism and
Security Laws in India’ (2006) 20 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 93, 99. Kalhan has argued
that the executive encroachment on the independence of the judiciary creates a risk of political influence which is particularly pernicious in anti-terrorism cases which are more likely
to be politically charged. Kalhan has also discussed the use of special law in discriminating
against the Dalit, lower castes, tribal communities and religious minorities at 175-181.
NIA Act, s 11(2) and 22(2)(i).
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When the issues are of a judicial nature, only the judiciary should have the
exclusive authority to decide whether an issue submitted for its decision is
within its competence, as defined by law.23
The manner of operation and the prosecution conducted by the designated
Special Courts is described in the following paragraphs.
Special Courts under the NIA Act are of two categories, those designated
by the Central Government, and those by the state governments. The Special
Courts designated by the Central Government are defined under Section 11 as:
The Central Government shall, in consultation with the Chief
Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official
Gazette, for the trial of Scheduled Offences, designate one
or more Courts of Session as Special Court for such area or
areas, or for such case or class or group of cases, as may be
specified in the notification.
Similarly, the second category of Special Courts are designated under
Section 22. While the Central Government is under an obligation to designate
a Special Court, this power is of a discretionary nature for state governments.
The enactment defines the jurisdiction of Special Courts under Section 13 to
extend to all Scheduled Offences investigated by the NIA that have been committed within the local jurisdiction of the Special Court.
On the basis of the provisions delineated above, the jurisdiction of the
Special Courts can be predicated upon the investigation undertaken under the
NIA Act. On the basis of the nature of investigation conducted under Sections
6, 7, and 10, the cases registered under Scheduled Offences can be classified
into four broad classes:
[a] Where the Central Government directs the NIA to investigate the case either within fifteen days after receiving the
report from the state government [Section 6(4)] or on suo
motu direction at any stage [Section 6(5)].
[b] Where the Central Government directs the NIA to investigate the case, and the NIA requests the state government to
remain associated with the case, i.e. NIA and state investigating agency, both investigate the case [Section 7(a)].
23

United Nations General Assembly, ‘Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary General Assembly Resolutions 40/32 and 40/146’ (29 November 1985); ‘Compendium of
United Nations Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice’ (Milan,
1985) 149; Constitution of India 1950, art 50; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art 14(1).
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[c] Where the Central Government directs the NIA to investigate the case, and the NIA, having sought prior approval
from the Central Government, transfers the case to the
state government i.e. only the state investigating agency
investigates the case, but after approval from the Central
Government [Section 7(b)].
[d] Where the Central Government does not direct the NIA
to investigate the case, i.e. either it does not consider that the
case falls within the ambit of a Scheduled Offence, or having
regard to the gravity of the offence and other relevant factors,
it considers that it is not a fit case for the NIA to investigate,
the state investigating agency proceeds with the investigation
and trial of the case [Section 10].
Based on this classification, the first two classes of cases are tried by
the Special Courts designated under Section 11, as notified by the Central
Government. It is also apparent that the third class of cases are to be tried by
the Special Court designated under Section 22 by the state governments.
The status of trials classified under the fourth class of cases requires deliberation. If the Central Government does not direct the NIA to investigate
the case, by default, the state investigating agency continues to investigate.24
The question that arises then is, whether the investigation and prosecution of
such a case is to be conducted as per the procedures in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’), the ordinary law of procedure in India, or whether
the special procedure under the NIA Act would come into play, merely because
these are Scheduled Offences, even though the Central Government does not
consider them fit for investigation by the NIA. This is examined in the next
sub-section of the paper.

B. Section 22 and the Question of Procedural Misuse
For the purpose of reference the contents of Section 22 are quoted below:
22. The Power of state government to designate25 Special Court:
(1) The state government may designate one or more Courts of Session26 as
Special Courts for the trial of offences under any or all the enactments
specified in the Schedule.
24
25

26

NIA Act, s 6(7) and 10.
The word ‘constitute’ has been substituted by the word ‘designate’ after the NIA
(Amendment) Act of 2019.
The words ‘constitute one or more Special Courts’ have been substituted by ‘designate one or
more Courts of Session’ after the NIA (Amendment) Act of 2019.
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(2) The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to the Special Courts designated27 by the state government under sub-section (1) and shall have
effect subject to the following modifications, namely(i) references to “Central Government” in Sections 11 and 15 shall
be construed as references to state government;
(ii) reference to “Agency” in sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall be
construed as a reference to the “investigation agency of the state
government”;
(iii) reference to “Attorney General for India” in sub-section (3) of
Section 13 shall be construed as reference to “Advocate General
of the State”.
(3) The jurisdiction conferred by this Act on a Special Court shall, until
a Special Court is designated28 by the state government under sub-section (1) in the case of any offence punishable under this Act, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, be exercised by the Court of
Session of the division in which such offence has been committed and it
shall have all the powers and follow the procedure provided under this
Chapter.
(4) On and from the date when the Special Court is designated29 by the
state government the trial of any offence investigated by the state
government under the provisions of this Act, which would have been
required to be held before the Special Court, shall stand transferred to
that Court on the date on which it is designated.
This paper proceeds with the argument that the state governments have
accorded a wider jurisdiction to the Special Courts created under Section 22
than what was intended by the legislature. Sub-section (1) gives discretion to
the state government to designate Special Courts for the trial of any or all the
enactments in the Schedule. At the threshold, Section 22 does not lay down
the circumstances under which the state government’s investigating agency can
investigate the Scheduled Offence under the provisions of the NIA Act. In the
absence of this clarification, Sub-section (2) clause (ii) quoted above, equates
the state investigating agency to the NIA. The clause modifies the reference
to ‘Agency’ in Section 1330 to be construed as the “investigation agency of the
state government”. Therefore, this phraseology leads to an erroneous conclusion that analogous to Section 11, where the NIA happens to be the investigating agency in a case tried by the Special Court, the “investigation agency
27

28
29
30

The word ‘constitute’ has been substituted by the word ‘designate’ after the NIA
(Amendment) Act of 2019.
ibid.
ibid.
NIA Act, s 13(1).
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of the state government” is assumed to play that role in a case tried by the
Special Court designated under Section 22 of the NIA Act. This assumption then leads to the erroneous inference that the provisions of the NIA Act
(instead of the CrPC) would get attracted once a Scheduled Offence is alleged,
irrespective of whether or not the Central Government entrusted the case to
the NIA as under Sections 6(4) or (5) of the NIA Act. This ambiguity in the
provision has enabled the state governments to liberally interpret Section 22
to mean that the NIA Act can be employed every time an offence enumerated
in the enactments in the Schedule is committed, whether or not the Central
Government has thought it fit for investigation by the NIA.
This question assumes immense importance, especially in an internal conflict zone of the country such as Bastar, because of the large number of cases
tried under national security related laws enumerated in the Schedule. In
Bastar, while there are only three cases31 that are currently under investigation
by the NIA, more than five hundred cases investigated by the Chhattisgarh
state investigating agency under the Scheduled Offences have been instituted
before the Special Court designated under Section 22 of the NIA Act.32 The
procedures under the NIA Act, carved out to investigate and prosecute grave
offences against national security, are extremely harsh and restrictive. Under
the NIA Act, the Special Court is empowered to hold a summary trial for
offences with punishment not exceeding three years,33 as opposed to two years
under the CrPC.34 The Act also overrides the provision of the CrPC that prescribes that no sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding three months
can be imposed if there is a conviction after a summary trial.35 Furthermore,
the Special Court has the power to proceed with a trial in the absence of the
accused or the pleader,36 to take cognizance without committal proceedings by
the magistrate having jurisdiction,37 to conduct “in camera” proceedings if it so
desires,38 to hold proceedings at any place to be decided by the Special Court,39

31

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

‘The Ambush on CRPF Team, Jheerum II, Tahakwada Incident, 2014’ (National Investigation
Agency) <www.nia.gov.in/case-detail.htm?52/Ambush+on+CR PF+team+Jheer um+II+
Tahakwada+incident> accessed 26 April 2020; ‘Darbha Jheerum Ghati Attack Case, 2013’
(National Investigation Agency) <www.nia.gov.in/case-detail.htm?46/Darbha+Jheerum+Ghati+
Attack+case> accessed 26 April 2020; ‘Death of Mr Bheema Mandavi in an IED Blast by CPI
(Maoist), Dantewara, Chhattisgarh, 2019’ (National Investigation Agency) <www.nia.gov.in/
case-detail.htm?263/Death+of+Mr+Bheema+Mandavi+in+a+IED+blast+by+CPI+Maoist+
Dantewara+Chhattisgarh> accessed 26 April 2020.
See n 5.
NIA Act, s 16(2).
CrPC, s 260(1)(i).
NIA Act, s 16(2).
NIA Act, s 16(5).
NIA Act, s 16(1).
NIA Act, s 17(1).
NIA Act, s 17(3)(a).
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or if it considers “expedient or desirable”, to sit for any of its proceedings at
any place other than the ordinary place of sitting.40
These special procedures deviate from ordinary criminal procedure that
secures the rights of the accused at all stages of the trial. For example, the
power of a Special Judge to take cognizance of the offence without the committal proceedings abrogates an essential step in the criminal trial and is
contrary to the procedure of ordinary Sessions triable cases.41 For ordinary Sessions triable cases, the case is first brought before the Chief Judicial
Magistrate (‘CJM’) having territorial jurisdiction over the case, who, after
ensuring the sufficiency of the material on record, commits the case to the
Court of Sessions for trial.42 Before the committal of the case, the accused also
has a chance of applying for bail before the committing CJM, and can also
approach the Court of Sessions43 after the rejection of bail by the CJM.
It will be illustrative to examine an example of Bastar in the context of circumventing committal proceedings. Once the offence under the UAPA is registered, the case is immediately transferred to the NIA Special Judge in the
District and Sessions Court of Bastar at Jagdalpur. For instance, if the accused
is arrested in a case registered in Sukma and lodged in Sukma Sub-Jail (at a
distance of more than 100 kilometres from the Special Court at Jagdalpur), the
remand hearing takes place before the Special Judge at Jagdalpur instead of the
CJM at Sukma, who otherwise had territorial jurisdiction over the case. For an
accused, the production before the Special Court at Jagdalpur for remand hearings is fraught with challenges due to lack of security and vehicles to ferry the
accused. Accessing legal representation also becomes difficult since the lawyers from Sukma, hired by the family of the accused, are required to travel to
Jagdalpur for every remand hearing. The absence of the pleader of choice at
the remand stage results in the denial of proper legal representation, and the
accused is unable to bring complaints regarding custodial violence, forced confession, or medical illnesses to the notice of the court at the first instance.44

40
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NIA Act, s 12.
CrPC, s 193.
CrPC, s 209.
CrPC, s 439.
Sodi Hunga s/o Joga Hunga, age 45 years, was the accused in FIR No. 16/2018 Police Station
Kistaram, Sukma under UAPA, s 38, 39(1) and 39(2); Explosive Substances Act, s 4 and 5;
IPC, s 147, 148, 149 and 307; Arms Act, s 25 and 27. Sodi was in judicial custody in Sukma
Sub-Jail. He died of an ‘unknown illness’ on 28 February 2019. His remand hearing before
the Special Court at Bastar District and Sessions Court, Jagdalpur was on 15 February 2019.
The order-sheet dated 15 February 2019 recorded that the accused was not brought from
the Jail and the production warrant was also unserved. The Special Court gave directions
to the Sub-Inspector of Police Station Kistaram to comply with the remand proceedings by
the next date of remand hearing fixed on 1 March 2019. On the next date, i.e. 1 March 2019,
it was informed that the accused had died. The medical reports show that the police did
not get a CT-Scan of the accused despite several requests by the doctors. The medical and
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Another important procedural deviation under the NIA Act is the restriction on the legal remedy to seek bail.45 The High Court under Section 439 of
the CrPC has unfettered power to grant bail. However, under the NIA Act, the
accused is prevented from approaching the High Court under this provision.
Instead, on the rejection of bail by the Special Judge, the accused can only
appeal against this order before the Division Bench of the High Court within
thirty days46 of the order. The NIA Act, therefore, imposes restrictions on the
liberty of the accused that are not otherwise intended under ordinary procedural law, or even under substantive laws such as the UAPA for instance.
Treating all cases registered under the enactments mentioned in the
Schedule to the NIA Act also abridges the procedures listed in the primary
legislation pertaining to that particular offence. For instance, the provisions for
bail under the UAPA get overridden by those of the NIA Act, UAPA being
one of the enactments in the Schedule. The provision for bail under the UAPA
already places a harsh burden of proving innocence for the grant of bail.47
However, it still does not impede the High Court’s unrestricted power to grant
bail under Section 439 CrPC. The NIA Act, however, imposes additional
restrictions that result in the denial of liberty to the accused.
Similarly, the power of the courts to choose the place of court proceedings “at any place” when it is “expedient or desirable” could legitimize holding court proceedings, for example, in a prison facility, or any closed premises.
This not only denies the right to a public hearing, but also does not comply
with the right to a trial proceeding that is fair, conducive, free of intimidation,
and accessible to the relatives of the accused. Lastly, the arguments furthering
the creation of Special Courts, which are based on the need for speedy disposal
of cases, also do not resonate with reality. A study on special courts (including NIA Special Courts) has concluded that giving an already existing court
an extra designation of ‘Special Court’ has resulted in increased workload
on the courts and raised questions about efficiency due to the prevailing case
pendency.48
Therefore, with the enactment of the NIA Act and the executive excess by
state governments, the Parliament has re-enacted restrictions on the liberty of
the accused that the substantive laws had never intended. It is also pertinent to
note that in terms of revocation of procedural rights, the NIA Act is far more
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postmortem reports from Sukma Sub-Jail have been received after an appeal under the Right
to Information Act 2005. The author has access to it for reference.
NIA Act, s 21 is identical to TADA, s 20 and POTA, s 34.
NIA Act, s 21(4).
UAPA, s 43D(5).
Sakshi, ‘What is Special About Special Court?’ The Hindu (5 January 2017) <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/What-is-special-about-special-courts/article16978952.ece> accessed
23 April 2020. The study was conducted by Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, New Delhi.
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detrimental, for it impacts a very wide range of substantive laws as mentioned
in the Schedule. The NIA Act further enables the Central Government to abuse
its powers to expand the scope of the Act by adding more offences to the
Schedule. For instance, the recent 2019 amendment has incorporated offences
pertaining to trafficking of persons and minors for sexual exploitation or forced
labour to the Schedule, which are wholly unrelated to national security.49

C. The High Courts’ View on Section 22: The Bahadur Kora
Judgment
The state of Bihar offers an instructive case study on the procedural misuse of Section 22 of the NIA Act and its rectification by judicial intervention.
In Bihar, a Division Bench of the High Court in Aasif P.K. v State of Bihar50
had held that since the UAPA is one of the enactments listed in the Schedule
to the NIA Act, whenever an allegation is made against an accused under the
provisions of the UAPA, the procedure prescribed under the NIA Act must be
followed.51 It was also held that even if the cognizance of offences was taken
in accordance with the provisions of the CrPC and the investigation was undertaken by the state investigating agencies, and not by the NIA, the trial of such
offences shall be conducted by the court as provided under Section 22.52
As a result of Aasif’s judgment, the cases registered under the UAPA were
indiscriminately transferred to the Court of Sessions for trial under the NIA
Act. The immediate consequence of the application of the special law was
a transgression from the bail provision. In Bihar, there was a phenomenal
increase in the appeals against the orders passed by the Special Judge before
the High Court.53 The Division Bench of the High Court that heard the appeals
under Section 21(4) observed that in none of these cases had the investigation
been entrusted to the NIA by the Central Government under Sections 6(4) or
(5) of the Act, nor had the investigation been transferred to the state investigating agency under Section 7(b). The counsels appearing for the accused as
well as the public prosecutors pleaded that indiscriminate transfer of cases to
Special Courts subjects the accused to stringent procedures under the special
law.54 This consequence of the implementation of Aasif’s judgment prompted
the Division Bench to refer the case to a Full Bench for a more detailed
examination.
49
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‘SC Issues Notice on Plea Challenging Validity of NIA Amendment Act 2019’ (LiveLaw News
Network, 20 January 2020) <https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/sc-issues-notice-on-plea-challenging-validity-of-nia-amendment-act-2019-151806?infinitescroll=1> accessed 23 April 2020.
(2015) (1) P.L.J.R. 1017.
Bahadur Kora (n 8) [2].
Since the Bihar state government had not created a Special Court under s 22(1), a Sessions
Court, as provided for under s 22(3) of the NIA Act was accorded the status of Special Court.
Bahadur Kora (n 8) [3].
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The Full Bench in Bahadur Kora,55 after delineating the purpose and the
objective of the law and interpreting Section 22 in the light of the procedures
to be followed under Sections 6 and 7 of the Act, rejected the opinion held in
Aasif’s case. Unequivocally, the Court observed that the objective of the NIA
Act is not to make the Scheduled Offences triable “invariably and exclusively”
under the NIA Act or the Special Courts constituted under it. It is only when
the offences are entrusted for an investigation to the NIA that they become triable by the Special Courts.56 The role and purpose of Section 22 of the Act
was identified to stem from Section 7 of the Act. The Court observed that
Section 7(b) gives discretion to the NIA to transfer the case to the state government for investigation and trial of the offence, with the previous approval
of the Central Government. Therefore, the state government can conduct the
investigation and trial of the case under the NIA Act only if Section 7(b) is
invoked. Barring that, the state government or its investigating agency does
not have any authority or discretion to choose or pick up cases, in which the
Scheduled Offences have been alleged, for investigation under the NIA Act.57
Aasif’s case was held to be erroneous for it failed to consider the circumstances under which the investigating agency of the state government comes
into the picture. Instead, it suggested that the NIA Act can be invoked once
an offence punishable under the UAPA is alleged, whether or not any steps
contemplated under Section 6 of the Act were taken.58 The Division Bench
in Aasif’s case had proceeded as though the state investigating agency had
the power to investigate the Scheduled Offences on its own accord. In a
way, therefore, the Division Bench had conferred greater power on the state
agency than the NIA in the context of trying Scheduled Offences. While the
NIA could not investigate any case unless it was entrusted to it by the Central
Government under Section 6, the decision of the Division Bench meant that
the state investigating agency could investigate such offences without any
requirement of entrustment by anyone whatsoever. This, in the view of the Full
Bench, had virtually negated the scheme of the Act.59
Similarly, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that the starting point for the application of the NIA Act was the decision of the Central
Government to proceed under the Act. Once the Central Government had
informed that the case was not being investigated under the NIA Act, then the
case on the file of the state government did not attract any of its provisions.60
Following the decision, a Single Bench of the Madras High Court held that the
executive notification issued by the Tamil Nadu state government to transfer
55
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the case in dispute investigated by the state investigating agency before the
NIA Special Court was directly overruling the judgment of the Division Bench
and was therefore non-est in the eye of law.61
The judgment in Bahadur Kora was not challenged before the Supreme
Court of India. In fact, in an appeal under Section 21(4) before the Division
Bench of the Rajasthan High Court,62 the standing counsel for the NIA submitted before the Court that the NIA had accepted the Bahadur Kora judgment as the correct position of law. Thus, the NIA accepted that unless the
investigation of a matter was entrusted to the NIA or the NIA transferred the
same to the state investigating agency, the state investigating agency did not
get the power to investigate or try the matter in accordance with the provisions
of the NIA Act.63 Despite this admission, the legal flaw remains unrectified in
the criminal justice system in Bastar and is further accentuated by the large
number of accused who are made to face trial before the Special Court.
However, Chhattisgarh is not the only state failing to adopt the correct position of law with regard to Section 22. The ambiguity in the law has resulted
in conflicting judicial opinions on the correct interpretation of Section 22.
The High Court of Delhi,64 the High Court of Kerala,65 and the High Court of
Karnataka66 have opined that Section 22 enables state governments to constitute Special Courts for the trial of offences under any or all of the enactments
specified in the Schedule to the NIA Act. These judgments, however, do not
examine the rationale of Section 22 within the scope and objective of the NIA
Act, and the functions of the NIA and the state investigating agencies, in light
of Sections 6 and 7. Unlike the Bahadur Kora judgment, the courts did not
purposively interpret Section 22, incorporating a reading of the provision in its
entirety, and also in the context of the intent of the statute.

D. Examining the Purposive Interpretation of Section 22
The Bastar region sees a large volume of cases involving left-wing extremism (‘LWE’). Currently, it is estimated that there are above 4,000 Adivasi
undertrials in jails in just over 1,100 cases in the Bastar division.67 The sheer
volume of cases involving LWE is evidenced by the fact that the District and
Sessions Court of Dantewada (South Bastar) contains a designated court of
61
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673.
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Additional District Judge as a Special Court for the trial of all ‘Naxalite Cases’
even though no such offence exists in the statute books.68 This Special Court
is designated to exclusively conduct trials of LWE cases under ordinary criminal procedure. Apart from the Special Court for ‘Naxalite Cases’ and the
NIA Special Court, all the other Additional District Judges in the four district
courts in Bastar are equally competent to conduct the trial of offences related
to LWE. This composition of the trial courts then necessitates an examination
of the basis and rationale of the classification of offences to be tried either by
special procedures under the NIA Act or ordinary procedures under the CrPC.
In order to illustrate the arbitrariness of such classification, it is important and
instructive to compare the powers and functions of the NIA Special Court in
Jagdalpur designated under Section 22 and the Special Court for the trial of
‘Naxalite Cases’ in Dantewada.
Both these courts are Sessions Court trying cases related to LWE that are
being investigated by the Chhattisgarh state investigating agencies. In all the
cases being tried before both the courts, there is neither any involvement of the
NIA in the investigation, nor has the Central Government considered them fit
for investigation by the NIA. Even the incarcerated accused appearing before
both the courts belong to similar socio-economic, ethnic, and alleged political
leaning. Effectively, all such cases are equally placed and yet the state government has proceeded with a two-fold classification of these cases wherein
one group is tried under ordinary criminal procedure whereas the other is tried
under special procedures laid down in the NIA Act. Offences like the UAPA
listed in the Schedule committed anywhere in the entire conflict area (four
jurisdictional/seven administrative districts) including South Bastar District
(Dantewada) are tried before the NIA Special Court. On the other hand, all
the other offences related to LWE commonly invoked in the region: i.e. the
Arms Act, the Explosive Substances Act, Chapter VI,69 Chapter VIII,70 and
Chapter XVI71 of the IPC and the Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act,
2005, committed within the local jurisdiction of South Bastar District,72 were
to be tried before the Special Court for ‘Naxalite Cases’. Quite clearly, there
is no legal rationale in this distinction. There is an overlap between the LWE
offences alleged under the penal code and the Scheduled Offences. This arbitrary classification subjects the cases tried before the NIA Special Court to
special procedures under the NIA Act which could have been potentially tried
by the Special Court for ‘Naxalite Cases’ under ordinary criminal procedure
under the CrPC.
68
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The Special Court for ‘Naxalite Cases’ has been operating since 2016 in District and Sessions
Court of South Bastar at Dantewada.
Of Offences Against the State.
Of Offences Against the Public Tranquillity.
Of Offences Affecting the Human Body.
After the Amendment of 2019, the offences under the Explosive Substances Act and the Arms
Act, s 25(1AA) will also be transferred to the NIA Special Court.
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This analogy of the classification of LWE cases in Bastar distinctly resonates with Justice Vivian Bose’s opinion in State of W.B. v Anwar Ali Sarkar:73
It may be that justice would be fully done by following the
new procedure. It may even be that it would be more truly
done. But it would not be satisfactorily done, satisfactory that
is to say, not from the point of view of the governments who
prosecute, but satisfactory in the view of the ordinary reasonable man, the man in the street. It is not enough that justice should be done. Justice must also be seen to be done and
a sense of satisfaction and confidence in it engendered. That
cannot be when Ramchandra is tried by one procedure and
Sakharam, similarly placed, facing equally serious charges,
also answering for his life and liberty, by another which differs radically from the first.74
In Anwar Ali Sarkar, the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 which
was instituted with the objective of providing a “speedier trial” for “certain
offences” was challenged on the ground of denial of equal protection of the
law enjoined by Article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court declared
the impugned provision as discriminatory and violative of Article 14 as the
classification of offences was too vague, uncertain, and too elusive a criterion
to form a rational basis for the discriminations made.75 The Supreme Court
expounded a two-fold test for any classification created by law to be proper
and rational. Firstly, the classification must be founded on an ‘intelligible differentia’ which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others.
Secondly, the differentia must have a reasonable relation, i.e. ‘rational nexus’,
to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.76

1.	 Closer Examination of the Objective of the NIA Act
The NIA Act was created by virtue of the competence of the Parliament
to make laws regarding the Central Bureau of Intelligence and Investigation
(Entry 8 of the Union List), and criminal law and criminal procedure
(Entries 1 and 2 respectively of the Concurrent List).77 The purpose of creating the NIA and the Special Courts for the prosecution of cases is described
in the “Statement of Objects and Reasons” of the NIA Act. This is to establish a national-level agency to investigate and prosecute offences affecting
the sovereignty, security, and integrity of India in a “concurrent jurisdiction
73
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framework”. Evidently, as has been already stated, the purpose of the NIA
Act was not to provide special procedures for the investigation and prosecution of offences enlisted in the Schedule, but to create a specialized investigating agency and a Special Court for the prosecution of the Scheduled Offences
investigated by such agency. Within the concurrent jurisdiction of the NIA,
the role of the state investigating agency is not usurped or displaced.78 In fact,
the power of the state governments to investigate and prosecute cases under
Scheduled Offences is protected if the case is not transferred to the NIA by the
Central Government.79 Therefore, in the absence of involvement of the NIA,
the NIA Act is not attracted, and the state investigating agency has to proceed
under the criminal law and procedure it is ordinarily bound by.
The resounding requirement for a special law like the NIA Act had emerged
from the concerns of functional limitations, restricted territorial jurisdiction,
limited resources of the state police with respect to crimes that have inter-state
and national ramifications, and the need for a specialized investigating agency
to investigate crimes across states, as recommended by Second Administrative
Reforms Commission.80 Therefore, the purpose was to create an investigating
agency for investigating offences related to national security that may require
investigation across states, and only such cases are to be tried by the Special
Court. The practice under Section 22, of invoking the Special Court’s jurisdiction in cases that are deemed to be unfit for investigation by the NIA, or
those that are being investigated by the state investigating agency in the ordinary course of action within its restricted territorial jurisdiction, is irreconcilable with the intended purpose of the NIA Act.

2.	 Judicial Response to Classification of Offences
As discussed in the preceding sections, the classification of offences emanating from the erroneous interpretation of Section 22 of the NIA Act violates
Article 14 within the parameters suggested in Anwar Ali Sarkar. Though this
paper relies on the two-fold test laid down in Anwar Ali Sarkar, it is pertinent
to briefly discuss the limitations of this test for examining national security
laws. Treating the preamble of the enactments and the object defined by them
78
79
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as sacrosanct for rationalizing the classification created by the laws may often
override the concern of personal liberty of the accused. Based on the phraseology of the preamble, while the objective of “speedier trial” was considered
vague in Anwar Ali Sarkar,81 the same bench in Kathi Raning Rawat v State
of Saurashtra82 considered the expression “to provide for public safety, maintenance of public order and preservation of peace and tranquility in the State”
to be a definitive and clear legislative policy for the trial of cases by the special court.83 Similarly, in Kartar Singh v State of Punjab,84 the Supreme Court
upheld the provisions of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)
Act (‘TADA’) and the classification of offences under it for prosecution before
special courts.85 The Court, relying on the speeches of the ministers and
Members of the Parliament,86 raised concerns about terrorist activities and considered it as a compelling reason for the legislators to enact the TADA.87 The
Court held that the persons who are to be tried for offences specified under
the provisions of TADA are a “distinct class of persons” and that the special
procedure prescribed for trying them for offences of “aggravated and incensed
nature” achieved the “meaningful purpose and object of the Act”.88
Kartar Singh’s judgment ignores the fact that the accused were treated as
a “distinct class of persons” precisely because they were prosecuted under the
special law.89 Considering the overlap between the offences under the penal
code and special laws (as observed in offences before the Special Court for
‘Naxalite Cases’ and the NIA Special Court), the accused could potentially
have been prosecuted under ordinary criminal procedure before a regular
court.90 The judgment also loses sight of the concern that even in the context of national security laws, the classification adopted by the executive, that
imposes special procedures curtailing the personal liberty of the accused, must
be tested against the principles of fairness. The explicit opinion of Justice P.N.
Bhagwati in Maneka Gandhi v Union of India91 reminds us that the principle
of reasonableness is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness that
pervades Article 14, like a “brooding omnipresence”. His opinion also reminds
us that the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must reflect the best of
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reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. The procedures
must be “right and just and fair” to meet the requirement of Article 14.92
The equal protection of laws guaranteed by Article 14 cannot be merely
reduced to the requirement that any legal classification of persons must be
based on a reasonable relation with the objective of the law.93 ‘Law’ is reasonable law and not any enacted piece.94 The wisdom of the Parliament that
enacted the law cannot be the sole standard of the validity and propriety of
the classification. Instead, any procedure adopted by the executive to be reasonable should be a “right and just and fair” procedure and not merely a formal procedure.95
The following section is based on empirical case studies from the Bastar
region and demonstrates that the classification of offences created by the
Chhattisgarh state government under Section 22 not only violates Article 14
but also violates the essential right to “fair and just and right” procedures, due
process of law, and access to justice under Article 21 of the Constitution.

III. ACCESSING JUSTICE AND FAIR TRIAL IN BASTAR
A. Criminal Justice System in Bastar
The Bastar division is spread over a geographical area of about 39,112.25
square kilometres,96 an area larger than many states in India. It comprises of
seven administrative districts – Kanker, Kondagaon, Narayanpur, Bastar,
Dantewada, Sukma, and Bijapur. The sparse population in the Bastar division
is overwhelmingly tribal.97 These people live in villages dotted in a forested
landscape with few urban centres, low population density,98 and road density.
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Approximately 70% of total population constitute the Adivasi (Scheduled Tribe). See
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26April 2020.
The Bastar division has an average population density of 72.8 per square kilometre. The
Bastar division currently comprises of seven districts. But in 2011, it comprised of five districts- Bastar, Narayanpur, Bijapur, South Bastar Dantewada, and North Bastar Kanker
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The average literacy rate in Bastar division is 51.25%, which is far lower in
comparison to the state average of Chhattisgarh (70.28%) and the national
average (74.04%).99 Economically, the population is cash poor. 44.61% of the
rural population in Chhattisgarh was reported to live below the poverty line,
the highest amongst all states.100
As already mentioned, Bastar sees a large volume of cases involving LWE
and it has an Additional District Judge’s court designated as the Special Court
for ‘Naxalite Cases’ in the District and Sessions Court of South Bastar at
Dantewada. In dealing with the process of investigation, criminal trial, and
defence, the language and distance from the courts act as a barrier for the
undertrials, for those arrested, and for their kin and relatives.101 A majority
of those arrested are Adivasis who speak the local languages of Gondi, Halbi,
Dorla, and speak little to no Hindi. The spoken and written language used by
the police, lawyers, and the Court is formal Hindi. This Hindi is different from
the way it is spoken colloquially, and common citizens find it hard to understand. The cost of transport, the distance, and the inaccessibility of the jails
and courts from the villages, often prevent family members from meeting their
incarcerated relatives. Most criminal trials are not conducted in the districts in
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North Bastar Kanker District is 70.29%, and of Bijapur District is 40.86%. ‘Districts in IndiaCensus 2011’ (Census India) <https://www.censusindia.co.in/districts> accessed 29 April 2020;
‘Chhattisgarh Population 2011-2020 Census’ (Census 2011) <https://www.census2011.co.in/
census/state/chhattisgarh.html> accessed 29 April 2020; ‘State of Literacy’ (Office of the
Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India) <https://censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/data_files/india/Final_PPT_2011_chapter6.pdf> accessed 29April 2020.
‘Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy 2018-19’ (Reserve Bank of India 2018) 237
<https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/0HB2018-19A91A298806164470A2BCEF30
0A4FE334.PDF> accessed 26 April 2020.
This information is based on the author’s firsthand experience, gained during the course of
legal practice, data collection, interviews with the litigants, local trial court lawyers, and
cases represented by the Jagdalpur Legal Aid Group.
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situ because the Government has not yet created an infrastructure for a District
and Sessions Court in some of the administrative districts.102 In one of the
cases, the lawyers had to establish contact with the accused’s family members
so as to vouch for the accused as a surety. However, in this case, even after
the grant of bail, it took them eight months to establish contact with the family members on account of the remoteness of the village.103 The large distance
between the courts and the jails also makes the production of the accused in
the court irregular. This is due to a lack of enough police guards and vans to
ferry all the accused to the court from the jails.104 In a case currently pending at a preliminary stage before the NIA Special Court, there are more than
a 100 accused, against whom charges have not been framed since 2017, due to
the inability to produce all the accused before the Court.105 With a staggeringly
low rate of bail106 and a high rate of acquittal,107 delays in the disposal of cases
due to administrative oversight in the implementation of the legal machinery is
a fortiori a denial of justice.

102

103

104

105

106

107

‘Distt & Sessions Court in Narayanpur soon, assures Raman’ The Pioneer (Narayanpur, 15
May 2018). There are only four District and Sessions Courts for seven administrative districts.
As of December 2019, the District and Sessions Court of South Bastar (located in Dantewada)
has jurisdiction over Dantewada, Sukma, and Bijapur districts. Kondagaon District and
Sessions Court (located at Kondagaon) has jurisdiction over Kondagaon and Narayanpur district. Bastar District and Sessions Court (located at Jagdalpur) and North Bastar District and
Sessions Court (located at Kanker) are independent judicial districts.
State v Irpa Narayan (Ist ADJ Dantewada, 2014) – reported by Jagdalpur Legal Aid Group in
the Eighth Update circulated in April 2014.
Data on presentation of undertrials in court from Jagdalpur Central Jail, collected by the
Jagdalpur Legal Aid Group for six months from July 2014 to December 2014, depicted that
only 56% to 88% of the undertrials could get hearings. The data collected by the organization
can be accessed from the author/erstwhile members of the Jagdalpur Legal Aid Group.
Sessions Trial No. 55/2017, FIR No. 07/2017, Police Station Chintagufa, Sukma (trial of
Burkapal Massacre case of 2017). There are 111 accused charge-sheeted for now and several
others are recorded to be absconding.
As per the findings of the Jagdalpur Legal Aid Group for the years 2010-2013, based on
annual jail reports and NCRB data, every year approximately 75% of the undertrials who
have been imprisoned are granted bail nationwide. However, of the prisoners in the Jagdalpur
Circle Jails (including the Jagdalpur Central Jail and the two district jails in Kanker and
Dantewada), only 30-40% of the undertrials applied for bail per annum, which is even lower
in Dantewada District Jail in isolation, where it stands around a mere 20%. As per jail reports
received under the RTI Act, from Dantewada District Jail: in annual year 2016-17, out of 1618
undertrials, total 1059 were released but only 4 were released on bail. In annual year 2017-18,
out of 1512 undertrials, total 803 were released but only 8 were released on bail. Between
2016-17 in Sukma Sub-Jail while total undertrials released were 102, not a single accused
was released on bail. The data can be accessed from the author/erstwhile members of the
Jagdalpur Legal Aid Group.
Data collected by the Jagdalpur Legal Aid Group. The average acquittal rate of data pooled
over all years is 95.7%, which for individual years ranged from 91.5% to 98.7% (2005-2013).
The data collected by the organization can be accessed from the author/erstwhile members of
the Jagdalpur Legal Aid Group. The same trend can also be seen from Table No. 1 on the status of cases before the Special Court under the NIA Act.
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B. Special Court at Bastar
On May 19, 2015, the Chhattisgarh Government issued a notification108
under Section 22 of the NIA Act designating the Additional Sessions Judge,
Bastar at Jagdalpur, as the NIA Special Court “for the trial of Scheduled
Offences”. It would have jurisdiction over the following civil districts: North
Bastar (Kanker), Bastar (Jagdalpur), and South Bastar (Dantewada).109
Consequently, all Scheduled Offences committed within the seven districts of
the Bastar region now stand transferred to the NIA Special Court at Jagdalpur,
to be tried under special provisions. From June 2015 to December 2019, a total
of 527 cases have been instituted before the Special Court, out of which 214
are still pending disposal. See Table 1 for a compilation of the data relating to
the number of cases pending and disposed of in the Special Court.
Table 1: Cases Instituted Before the NIA Special Court in
Bastar from 2015 to 2019

Year

No. of Cases

Acquittal

Conviction

Prosecution
Evidence

Charge

Waiting for
Record

Presence of
Accused

Statement
of Accused

Accused
Absconding

Total
Pending

Pending Cases (Stage)

2015

183

169

2

9

3

0

0

0

0

12

2016

93

76

2

9

1

5

0

0

0

2017

63

36

2018

119

2019

69

Total

527

6

1

3

0

0

15
27

0

17

24

0

77

17

0

0

1

0

95

4

0

30

34

0

0

0

1

65

309

4

142

61

6

3

1

1

214

In the Bastar division, so far, there are only three cases that were investigated by the NIA.110 With the transfer of all cases involving Scheduled
Offences to Jagdalpur, there is a significant increase in the pendency of cases
in that Court, antithetical to the very idea of creating a Special Court, which
is meant for speedy disposal of cases. Further, there is also an increase in the
number of prisoners brought to Jagdalpur Central Jail from other parent districts.111 This creates an undue burden on the family of the prisoners, who
108

109

110
111

Government of Chhattisgarh, Law and Legislative Affairs Department, Mantralaya Mahanadi
Bhawan, ‘F. No. 4659/1292/XXI-B/C.G./2015’ (19 May 2015).
While the Sessions Court Judge at Bilaspur retained jurisdiction over rest of the districts of
Chhattisgarh.
See n 31.
PAIRVI (Public Advocacy Initiatives for Rights and Values in India), ‘Prisoners’ Rights and
Prisoners’ Reforms in Chhattisgarh’ (Prison Statistics of Chhattisgarh, September 2019). The
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have to navigate harsh terrains and undertake expensive journeys to meet their
family members in jail. The distance between the Bastar Court at Jagdalpur
and the local police stations investigating the case is often hundreds of kilometres. It is therefore not convenient for witnesses to appear in Court, which
leads to further delays in the trials. In one of the cases before the NIA Special
Court, over twenty-five opportunities were given to the prosecution to produce
witnesses to be examined before the Court.112
The right to access to justice not only flows from providing adequate and
competent legal aid, but also in creating a judicial infrastructure that promotes
speedy disposal of cases, access to lawyers of choice, and access to courts as
well. In Anita Kushwaha v Pushap Sudan,113 the Supreme Court summarized
four parameters that constitute the essence of access to justice, i.e., the effectiveness of the adjudicatory mechanism, its reasonable accessibility in terms
of distance, speediness, and its affordability. The court system in Bastar
demonstrates a systemic breakdown of all four facets of access to justice. The
local courts are equally competent to deal with criminal cases. For instance,
Dantewada already has a designated court for the prosecution of LWE-related
cases within its jurisdiction and it also has a Fast Track Court. Therefore, a
transfer of cases only imposes unnecessary delays in trial proceedings, and
excessive hardship on the accused, their families, and the witnesses.
The next section narrates the story of one of the many victims of this judicial quagmire.

C. The Aftermath of the Special Law in Bastar: The Kafkaesque
Case of Raju S/O Pugdu
Raju, an Adivasi aged over 60 years, was arrested from his village Kilam in
Narayanpur district in September 2016 and was accused of being a Naxalite.

112

113

report records that in Chhattisgarh, Jagdalpur Central Jail has 177.56% overcrowding, while
Kanker District Jail from Bastar area and Sukma Sub-Jail have 34.25% and 79.61% overcrowding respectively.
Padam Kashyap v State of Chhattisgarh Criminal Appeal 1546 of 2019 (High Court of
Chhattisgarh). The appellant was granted bail after almost 3.5 years on the grounds of delay.
The author represented the accused for seeking bail and the details of delay were argued
before the High Court of Chhattisgarh. Padam was arrested and charged as accused in two
criminal cases. The first case did not attract a Scheduled Offence and was tried under ordinary criminal procedure before the District Judge, Kondagaon District and Sessions Court.
Padam has been acquitted in that case on 16 November 2018 after examination of seventeen
witnesses. The second case registered under the UAPA was transferred to the NIA Special
Court at Jagdalpur. Despite the acquittal in the first case he was languishing in jail because
of the delay in trial before the NIA Special Judge. In both the cases, at least five prosecution
witnesses were the same.
(2016) 8 SCC 509 : AIR 2016 SC 3506.
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The case was registered under the UAPA, amongst other serious offences.114
Raju’s arrest was based on a permanent arrest warrant issued in 2007 which
was still active as of 2016. A defence of mistaken identity was raised by the
accused before the CJM, Kondagaon District Court. Raju had informed that
his father’s name was Pugdu while the arrest warrant mentioned another Raju
s/o Vaddi Muriya. The case was then transferred to the NIA Special Court in
Jagdalpur on December 6, 2016. The Trial Court’s order sheet dated December
6, 2016 transferring the case stated: “In notification no. 858/DO-16-01/2013
Kondagaon dated 03/09/2015 issued by the office of District and Sessions
Court Kondagaon, it has been ordered to transfer the cases under the UAPA
for trial before the Special Judge (NIA), Jagdalpur, District Bastar.”
Although the case was transferred to Jagdalpur, the case record was not.
For over two-and-a-half years, the case record was untraceable, and despite
repeated memorandums sent by the Special Judge, the record room in
Kondagaon did not send the files. Raju remained in jail without even knowing
the nature of his alleged crimes or the possible options for his defence.
Although the delay in his trial was entirely due to the administrative incompetence of transferring case records between two courts, Raju was not granted
bail. His bail was rejected twice by the NIA Special Judge. Raju’s family
was left with only two options: either continue to wait indefinitely, or travel
400 kilometres to the High Court at Bilaspur and engage a private lawyer to
appeal under Section 21(4) against the Special Judge’s order dismissing the
bail, within the available window of thirty days as per the NIA Act. In cases
of this nature, given the tight constraints of time, the right of the accused to
approach the High Court for bail is subject to the filing of the bail application
by his trial court lawyer and the subsequent rejection of the bail by the Special
Judge. If the lawyer is not inclined to apply for bail for his alleged Naxalite
client or withdraws the bail application, the relatives of the accused are not left
with any legal recourse - (apart from hiring a different trial court lawyer) - like
approaching the High Court under Section 439 CrPC.
The files in Raju’s case were traced only after the High Court of
Chhattisgarh issued a notice to the state government on an appeal under
Section 21(4) filed on his behalf.115 From the record, it surfaced that the trial in

114
115

IPC, s 147, 148, 149, 452, 364 and 302; Arms Act, s 25; UAPA, s 23, 38(2) and 39(2).
Raju v State of Chhattisgarh Criminal Appeal No. 93 of 2019 (High Court of Chhattisgarh).
The author represented the accused Raju before the High Court of Chhattisgarh and the
information is as per the proceedings and documents presented before the Court; Soibam
Rocky Singh, ‘Case Files Missing: HC Grants Bail to Adivasi Man’ The Hindu (New Delhi,
22 March 2019); Aditya AK, ‘Painting the Town Red? Chhattisgarh HC Expresses Shock
as Adivasi Accused Languishes in Jail for Want of Trial Record’ (Bar and Bench News, 16
March 2019) <https://www.barandbench.com/news/painting-town-red-chhattisgarh-hc-accusedlanguishes-jail-trial-records> accessed 23April 2020.
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this same case had already been conducted three times against sixteen others
who were arrested and acquitted in less than one year of the trial by the regular criminal court under ordinary criminal procedure. Raju was stated to be the
absconding accused in all these trials. Raju was ultimately granted bail by the
Division Bench of High Court of Chhattisgarh in February 2019 considering
“these exceptional circumstances”.116
Raju’s arrest braided together with the procedural misuse of the NIA Act
illustrates the contravention of all basic tenets of justice, due process, and fundamental rights. The alleged offences in this case were committed in 2007,
even before the enactment of the NIA Act in 2008. The investigation of the
case was neither conducted by the NIA under Sections 6(4) or (5), nor was
it transferred to the Chhattisgarh state police by the NIA under Section 7(b).
Despite lacking a statutory mandate, the Chhattisgarh Government proceeded
to prosecute the case before the Special Court on the basis of the 2015 notification and this was done with retrospective effect. In stark contrast to this,
the co-accused in the same case, who were prosecuted and acquitted of the
same charges prior to the 2015 notification, were tried under ordinary criminal procedures before a regular court having territorial jurisdiction over the
case. Raju’s case also highlights the fallacy of the classification of the offences
created by the misuse of the Act. The prosecution of the offences under the
UAPA, that otherwise resulted from an arbitrary and questionable arrest by the
local police, was then subjected to the special provisions of the NIA Special
Court. Thus, the purpose and operation of the NIA Act has been subverted to
increase the hardships of the accused as well as the legal system that already
has an objectionable track record.
This case study also underscores how the inequitable criminal justice
machinery in a conflict setting is transformed into another tool for the harassment and persecution of marginalized communities. Whether this is a case of
mistaken identity, illegal arrest, and persecution or not, is up for deliberation
before the Special Judge. However, it is only the beginning of another process of injustice where the accused, now on bail, will have to travel from the
Narayanpur District to Jagdalpur (over 130 kilometres) on every date of hearing – until the Court decides that he is not the Raju that the prosecution claims
he is. For attending every hearing, Raju will have to spend Rs. 400 on his bus
ticket to and from Jagdalpur, since the state has no public transport system.
Similarly, the prosecution witnesses too will have to undertake the cumbersome travel to Jagdalpur. To get the witnesses to appear before the Court on
every date of the hearing will be another trial in itself for the Special Court.

116

ibid.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
LEGAL REFORMS IN BASTAR
To address the problem discussed in this paper, reformative action should
be geared towards the decentralization of the judicial infrastructure so as to
provide access to courts at the localized, grassroots level. The jurisdiction of
the NIA Special Court in Jagdalpur should be immediately defined to extend it
to only those cases that are entrusted by the Central Government to the NIA,
and thereafter are either investigated jointly by the NIA and the Chhattisgarh
state government, or are transferred to the state investigating agency by the
NIA. Per contra, if the need for a Special Court is echoed for the purpose of
speedy trials, it would only be proper to conduct the trial of the cases on a
fast-track mode under ordinary criminal procedure before the regular District
and Sessions Courts of Chhattisgarh, including those in Bastar.
Similarly, to reduce the hardship of the litigants to approach the High Court
for challenging the infraction of the fundamental rights, a bench of the High
Court of Chhattisgarh must preside in South Chhattisgarh. With accessibility
to the Court, a greater number of cases will come before the High Court for
its scrutiny, which will maintain the High Court’s scrupulous superintendence
over the subordinate courts.117 If the High Court is unable to extend its reach
to the prospective litigants, it should devise a mechanism for justice to reach
the people. For example, the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, headed by
Chief Justice J. Gita Mittal, amended the High Court Rules to facilitate filing
of motions before the High Court by persons residing in any remote area in
Jammu and Kashmir.118 The notification prescribed the procedure for creating approved centres or post offices in remote areas for filing of the motions.
It also prescribed the appointment of paralegal volunteers or panel lawyers
appointed by the District State Legal Services Authority in every such centre,
for drafting of the motions on behalf of the litigants residing in such areas.
In broad terms, the prosecution, which is equipped with a special legislation that infringes upon personal liberty, must be held to strict standards. The
recognition of human rights through the lens of national security often besets
the constitutional and statutory due process rights. As a result, despite the
improbability and weakness of the evidence, the courts are reluctant to grant
bail, and often rely on the accusation as prima facie true.119 The investigations
and prosecutions based on confessions/disclosures written in Hindi by the
police should be strictly scrutinized. The adjudication of cases for seeking bail
or discharge should not equate unsubstantiated accusations with public interest.
117
118

119

Constitution of India 1950, art 227.
High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, Office of the Registrar General at Jammu, ‘Notification
No. 1615’ (16 March 2019).
UAPA, s 43D(5).
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The credibility of the evidence should be the basis of independent judicial decision-making. Bail should be a norm and not an exception,120 and the delay in
trials aggravated by the non-availability of the witness or non-production of the
accused from jails should be an important factor for the grant of bail.121

V. CONCLUSION
The executive excess by the Chhattisgarh state government to prosecute all
Scheduled Offences, that are investigated by the state investigating agency,
before a Special Court constituted under the NIA Act, subverts the basic principles of liberal jurisprudence – a fair and speedy trial, effective legal aid, and
protection against punitive detentions and arbitrary proceedings. The erroneous
interpretation of Section 22 adopted by the Chhattisgarh Government leads to
an inference that the provisions of the NIA Act, instead of the CrPC would
get attracted once a Scheduled Offence is alleged, irrespective of whether or
not the Central Government entrusted the case to the NIA under Sections
6(4) or (5) of the Act. As a result, the LWE offences in Chhattisgarh have
been classified into two categories, i.e. first, the offences that are enumerated
in the Schedule to the NIA Act (irrespective of the nature of investigating
agency involved) and second, all the other offences either under special laws
or the penal code. While the former category is prosecuted before the NIA
Special Court under special criminal procedures that abridge essential procedural rights of the accused, the latter are prosecuted before ordinary criminal
courts under the CrPC. This classification of offences fails to stand the twofold test laid down in Anwar Ali Sarkar122 which is guided by an examination
of ‘intelligible differentia’ having a reasonable relation to the object sought to
be achieved by the Act. The objective of the NIA Act is not to make Scheduled
Offences triable, “invariably and exclusively” under the NIA Act or the Special
Courts constituted under it. It is only when the offences are entrusted for an
investigation to the NIA that they become triable by the Special Courts. The
power of the state governments to investigate and prosecute offences under the
NIA Act is only derived from Section 7(b) of the NIA Act. This accords the
NIA the discretion to transfer the case to the state government only with the
previous approval of the Central Government. Further, substantive laws enumerated in the Schedule, such as the UAPA or the Explosive Substances Act,
do not oust the power of ordinary criminal courts to conduct the trial of the
offences defined thereunder. Peculiarly, despite the admission by the NIA in
Jagdish Singh,123 that the aforesaid legal interpretation is the correct position of
law, the state governments have continued to misuse the ambiguity in Section
22 to curtail the personal liberty of the accused. This illegality compounds
120
121
122
123

Sanjay Chandra v CBI (2012) 1 SCC 40.
Jayanta Kumar Ghosh v National Investigation Agency 2012 SCC OnLine Gau 591.
Anwar Ali Sarkar (n 9).
Jagdish Singh (n 62).

138

SOCIO-LEGAL REVIEW

VOL. 16

the institutional breakdown of the criminal justice system in remote areas like
Bastar, which is underpinned by its geographic, linguistic, economic, and procedural inaccessibility. The fact that this illegality has been operating unnoticed since 2015 after the issuance of the notification, stands to the testimony
of the marginalization of the Bastar region.
In Bastar, malicious prosecutions,124 illegal detentions, unlawful incarcerations, and extra-judicial killings have become a way of life since the escalation
of conflict in 2004.125 The enforcement of anti-terrorism laws is often perceived
as an extension of the counter-insurgency operation in the conflict setting. In
the face of insurgency, the concerns regarding national security are invoked
as a justification for adopting strategies that thwart the dispensation of justice.
Any effort to seek criminal legal reforms must resolve this juxtaposition of the
staggeringly high level of legal standards imposed on the indigenous Adivasi
to prove innocence, and the shoddy standards of investigation and prosecution.
A lenient approach in adherence to principles of criminal procedure and rules
of evidence cannot be adopted irrespective of the nature of the case or the
accusation.
In Bastar, the concern for unjust legal and juridical processes is not only
limited to its infringement upon fundamental and human rights of the Adivasis.
Politically, it also affects the dynamics of the Naxalite conflict and further
alienates the Adivasi communities from the state and its agenda of welfare,
development, and good governance. In the absence of initiatives undertaken by
the Government, vibrant legal reforms through judicial interventions to guarantee free, fair, speedy, and convenient access to justice in the remote areas
of Chhattisgarh can set an example for effective administration of justice, not
only in India, but also for criminal justice systems globally.
Postscript: This paper is based on the information gathered during the
documentation and litigation focused on access to justice and legal aid conducted by the author during the course of David W. Leebron Human Rights
Fellowship, 2018 in Chhattisgarh. After the submission of this paper to the
journal in September 2019, the legal validity of the Special Court constituted
124
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Malini Subramaniam, ‘Special Report: This Adivasi Man Would Have Been in Jail – Had
Bastar Police Not Used Whitener Ink’ (Scroll.in, 9 July 2019) <https://scroll.in/article/926552/
special-report-this-adivasi-man-would-have-been-in-jail-had-bastar-police-not-used-whitenerink> accessed 23 April 2020.
Bela Bhatia, ‘Three Bullets and Three Women: A ‘Fake Encounter in Bastar” (The Wire,
26 April 2019) <https://thewire.in/rights/bastar-naxals-maoists-security-forces> accessed
26 April 2020; Chitrangada Choudhury, ‘The NCST’s Report on Gangrapes and Assaults in
Bastar says there is breakdown of discipline among security forces’ The Caravan (12 May
2016) <https://caravanmagazine.in/vantage/bastar-ncst-report-gangrapes-assaults-result-breakdown-discipline> accessed 26 April 2020; Raksha Kumar, ‘India’s Adivasis Caught Between
State and Guerilla Violence’ (Sojourners, 8 May 2019) <https://sojo.net/articles/indias-adivasis-caught-between-state-and-guerilla-violence> accessed 26 April 2020.
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under Section 22 NIA Act, 2008 vide the notification dated May 15, 2015, of
the Chhattisgarh state government, has been challenged in a Public Interest
Litigation (Hari Degal v State of Chhattisgarh, WPPIL No. 3 of 2020, High
Court of Chhattisgarh). The petition has been admitted by the Hon’ble High
Court of Chhattisgarh vide order dated February 13, 2020. The author is representing the Petitioner before the Court.
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